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As this is being written, junior mortgage bonds of New York Central are selling
at 45; of Illinois Central at 38; and of'Southern Pacific at 34. Even before the Ger-
man hordes swept through Holland and Belgium such bonds of New York Central
had not sold in excess of 84; of Illinois Central in excess of 62; and of Southern
Pacific in excess of 64 for two years. These three systems were formerly regarded as
among the soundest financially, and even today there seems to be no immediate peril
of their bankruptcy. They have been mentioned here merely as nation-wide illustra-
tions of the depth to which railroad credit has sunk. Numerous other similar illustra-
tions could be given.
One mathematically minded is irresistibly tempted to sharpen his pencil and do
a bit of figuring when he sees, let us say, Szooooo,ooo of outstanding fl. mortgage
bonds of the X System ranging during recent years between 25 and 40, while the
federal government is borrowing money with the payment of practically no interest
and lending it broadcast at low rates. This figuring has produced the mathematical
conclusion that by borrowing around forty million dollars from the government at,
say, f% to buy up such an issue the X System would reduce its fixed charges by
nearly three and a half million dollars.
This simple mathematical conclusion has intrigued not only the amateur econ-
omists and railroad reorganizers but even such governmental representatives as
officers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and members of both Houses of
Congress, and, as well, such presumably hardheaded businessmen as the bankers
and industrial executives who make up the membership of the National Conference
of Investors.
The idea has been crystalized in proposed legislation to authorize the making by
Reconstruction Finance Corporation of loans to railroads to enable them to purchase
their outstanding obligations in order to reduce their fixed charges. This proposed
legislation has had the support both of Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the
National Conference of Investors, and is embodied in the so-called Omnibus Bill
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(S. 2o09) reported favorably to the two Houses of Congress by the Conference
Report of April 26, x94o.
The idea behind the proposed legislation is not something new, the product of
this depression decade. Much the same scheme was suggested by a group of security-
holders in connection with the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul reorganization of
1925-1928. It was there suggested that a large fund should be raised by assessment of
stockholders for retirement of bonds then selling at around 50. .For the reasons which
are developed below in the discussion of the present proposals, the suggestion was not
regarded as of any practical value.
While undoubtedly some reduction in railroad fixed charges could be accom-
plished over a period of time by the government loans now suggested for purchases
of railroad obligations, the difficulties in the way of any substantial accomplishment
have been much underestimated and the probable results much overestimated.
The present levels of railroad obligations are not the result of any flood of selling
by railroad bondholders. Many of the stronger holders, particularly banks and in-
surance companies, hold their railroad bonds against their own dollar obligations of
not immediate maturity. Accordingly, so long as there is any reasonable hope that
the bonds will be paid at maturity, or will approximate their original purchase price
before maturity, such holders are not anxious to sell their bonds. Indeed, it is one
of the. anomalies of the situation that for such holders many railroad bonds, at their
present low prices, constitute a hedge against inflation. While public utilities are
sufferers from inflation at the outset, ultimately rates and costs adjust themselves to
the inflation, with the result that at some point in an inflation the bonds of many
roads now selling at large discounts would probably sell at their principal amount.
From the technical market aspect of the problem, present low prices of railroad
bonds are due to a lack of buyers in a thin market. This lack of buyers is, of course,
due to lack of confidence in railroad credit. Nevertheless it is believed that were a
buyer to appear prepared to purchase any large amount of an outstanding issue of
any carrier comparable to the three which have been mentioned, the amount of
bonds which he could obtain at present prices would be negligible as compared with
the total amount of the issue. Indeed, once it were known that such a buyer was in
the market even discouraged bondholders who are selling at present prices would
tend to take courage and increase the level at which they would be willing to selL
It would require a very carefully managed market operation, with complete disregard
for the philosophies of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to accumulate any
substantial fraction of the total of any of today's low priced railroad obligations at
prices approximating those now prevailing.
A further practical difficulty lies in the unwillingness expressed by responsible
public officials that government money should be employed in such buying projects
except in association with private money and then, it is suggested, on terms by which
the government money should be preferred over the private money in the venture.
There can be no criticism of the government for taking this attitude. Indeed, it
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may well be questioned why the government should make to private enterprise the
large loans which the idea contemplates. Perhaps the answer, not wholly satisfying, is
that if every other kind of pressure group has its feet in the public trough, why
shouldn't the railroad investors get in too.
Assuming, however, that a government institution were willing to make the
proposed loans on terms of such priority, where could any private investors be found
to supply the subordinated funds for the purchase? If, as is the basic idea of the
suggestion, the bonds are to be purchased for the benefit of the railroad debtor, not
for the benefit of those who put up the money, and if the railroad to which the loans
are made is to be required to repay only the amount of the loan (and indeed that
with comparatively low interest), obviously there can be no profit for the lenders
above the purchase price. On the other hand, the very fact of the low prices of the
bonds proposed to be purchased demonstrates the serious risk of loss in the venture.
Why should any bank or private investor go into any such project on any basis, let
alone a subordinated basis, even if already heavily committed in bonds of the carrier
to which the loan was proposed to be made? If the private investor wants to invest
in additional bonds he will buy them outright and have the opportunity for a profit
at much less risk of loss than that to which he would be subject by contributing to a
joint government-private loan in which his contribution would be subordinated to
that of the government.
Were this scheme for buying up low-priced railroad obligations through govern-
ment aid ever to get substantially further than the superficial theorizing which has
heretofore prevailed, the responsible government officials might well question
whether the considerations affecting private investors mentioned in the next preced-
ing paragraph would not also affect the government investment. If the credit of our
railroads under private ownership and operation does not afford sufficient hope to
lift the prices of New York Central, Illinois Central or Southern Pacific bonds above
their present levels it may be that ultimate public ownership and operation is in-
evitable. If so, might not the government better purchase outright such bonds as it
can pick up at low prices rather than take them as collateral for a loan of their
purchase price?
This latter thought leads to a consideration of what is proposed to be done with
the purchased bonds once they are purchased with the proposed loan. Obviously if
they are not so cancelled that they can never again become obligations of the carrier
which issued them and to which the loan is made, the fixed charges of the debtor
may not have been reduced. This point has largely been overlooked in the discussion
of the proposed legislation. At least it has been overlooked by most of the protagonist
investors; perhaps not by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for the suggested
legislation has contemplated that the purchased bonds shall be kept alive and pledged
as collateral for the loan. Furthermore, this legislation contemplates that Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, as the lender,'and any purchaser from it of the loans,
shall have the right, even after bankruptcy or receivership of the borrower, to sell
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the pledged obligations in the event of any default on the loan and to become
absolute owner of such obligations.
An understanding of the problem thus presented requires consideration of the
legal effect of the pledge by a debtor of it6 own obligations as collateral to an obliga-
tion evidencing a loan. The legal implications of such a pledge are widely misunder-
stood. The subject is highly technical, btit the law governing it was settled long
before the enactment of Section "7 of the Bankruptcy Act, under which most railroad
reorganizations are now being effected.
If the X System issues its promissory note for $I,oooooo to evidence a loan of that
amount, and to secure the note pledges $2,ooo,ooo, principal amount, of its own
bonds, it has created only one debt, viz., the promissory note.' In other words, the
debt is but $i,ooo,ooo, not $,oooooo. This is true whether the $2,ooooo of pledged
bonds are for the first time "issued" by the pledgor as a part of the pledge, or
whether they are so-called treasury bonds, i., bonds previously issued but theretofore
repurchased by the pledgor, or whether they are purchased with the proceeds of the
loan. In the latter event, their repurchase by the issuer extinguishes them as debt.
This is also true whether the pledged bonds are secured or unsecured.
So long as no receiver or trustee is appointed of the pledgor's property or any
other creditor proceeding designed to crystalize the rights of all the creditors has
been instituted, the effect of the pledge is to give the pledgee a power of attorney to
issue the pledged securities by sale in enforcement of the pledge. Upon such a sale
the debt of the pledgor is increased by an amount dependent upon the proceeds of
the sale of the pledged bonds. For example, if in the case above put, the pledgee
sells the S,oooooo of pledged bonds for $75,ooo, the pledgor then has outstanding
$2,250,000 of debt, viz., the $2,000,000 of pledged bonds which have now been sold,
plus the $250,000 deficiency on the promissory note. This again is true whether the
pledged bonds be secured or unsecured.
When, however, the pledgor becomes the object of any legal proceeding designed
to crystalize the rights of its creditors inter se, the pledgee is no longer entitled to
sell the pledged bonds.' An injunction will issue against any such disposition of the
pledged bonds by the pledgee. It is believed, however, that an injunction is necessary
only for the purpose of preventing the creation of a cloud upon the pledgor's property
through the claim of a lien or other right in the pledgor's property by the purchaser
of the pledged bonds upon the purported enforcement of the pledge. Unless the
purchaser at the pledgee's sale were a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
the equities of the other creditors as against the pledged bonds (which, as a practical
matter, is unlikely), such a purchaser would not seem to have, even in the absence
' Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 (1899); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Rail-
way Steel Spring Co., 258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, i919); Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton Nat.
3ank, 263 Fed. 304 (C. C. A. 9th, 192o); Worth v. Marshall Field & Co., 240 Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1917); Bunerfield v. Woodman, 223 Fed. 956 (C. C. A. ist, 1915); Hitner v. Diamond States Steel Co.,
176 Fed. 384 (C. C. De., i91o).
'Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway Steel Spring Co., supra note z; Continental Illinois Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648 (1935).
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of an injunction, any greater rights than the pledgee himself. Obviously it would be
inequitable as between creditors to permit one creditor to increase the "debt" of the
insolvent to him after the estate of the debtor had been marshaled for distribution
among all creditors.
If the pledged bonds are unsecured obligations of the pledgor it has long been
well settled that the pledge is wholly nugatory in the enforcement of the rights of
the pledgor's creditors inter se. The pledgee can prove against the pledgor's estate
only for the debt, viz., the principal amount of the promissory note, and cannot
prove for anything in respect of the pledged bonds.
If, however, the pledged bonds are obligations secured by lien upon the pledgor's
property, the pledgee does have rights in that property arising out of the pledged
bonds. But those rights are not by way of creating the nominal amount of the
pledged bonds the debt of the pledgor. The only debt in the assumed situation still
remains the promissory note. But the effect of the pledge of the bonds is to give to
the pledgee, as security for that debt, that proportion of the mortgage securing the
pledged bonds which their nominal amount bears to the total nominal amount of
the bonds outstanding under that mortgage. The pledgee under such circumstances
may receive distribution of the value of the mortgaged property in enforcement of
the mortgage in that proportion, but only up to an amount which will equal the
total debt to him, viz., the amount of the claim on the promisory note. He may also
prove on the promissory note either for the full amount if the proceeding is in equity,
or for the deficiency if the proceeding is in bankruptcy, subject, however, to the
limitation that his total recovery, whether upon the promissory note or upon the
mortgage, shall not exceed the amount of the debt 4
Pursuing the above illustration further, if the pledged bonds were part of a total
issue of $s, oooooo, and the mortgaged property sold for $5,oooooo, the pledgee, out
of the mortgaged property, would be entitled to one fifth of "the proceeds, or $x,ooo,-
ooo, thus extinguishing the debt on the promissory note except for any unpaid
interest or other costs included in the debt under its terms. If in this assumed case
the mortgaged property sold for $7,oooooo, the pledgee would not be entitled to
retain the full one fifth of the proceeds, as owner of the pledged bonds, but would
be limited to the amount of the proceeds of the mortgaged property sufficient to
satisfy the debt on the promissory note. The remainder of the one fifth of the pro-
'Union National Bank v. Peoples Savings & Trust Co., 28 F. (2) 326 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928); Farst
National Bank of Beaumont v. Eason, 149 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 5th, x9o6; Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber
CO., 227 Fed. 698 (D. Mass., x9x5); Third Avenue National Bank v. Eastern R. R. Co., x22 Mass. 240
(1877); People v. Remington & Sons, 54 Hun. 480, 8 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1889) aff'd, 121 N. Y. 676, 24
N. E. 1o95 (x889); Dibert v. D'Arcy, 248 Mo. 617, 154 S. W. x116 (1913).
'Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 (1899); Hisner v. Diamond States Steel Co.,
176 Fed. 384 (C. C. Del, x91o); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway Steel Spring Co., svpra note 1;
Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton Nat. Bank, supra note x; Worth v. Marshall Field & Co.,
supra note a; Butterfield v. Woodman, supra note i;.American Brakeshoe & Foundry Co. v. New York
Railways, 277 Fed. 261 (S. D. N. Y., 1921); Atlantic Trust Co. v. Woodbridge Canal & Irrigation Co.,
86 Fed. 975 (C. C., N. D. Cal., 1897); Equitable Trust Co. v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power
Co., 228 Fed. 5z6 (D. Idaho, 1915); Simmons v. Taylor, 23 Fed. 849 (C. C., S. D. Iowa, 1885), app.
dismissed, 127 U. S. 52 (1887); Claflin v. South Carolina Railroad Co., 8 Fed. si8 (C. C., S. C., i8go).
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ceeds would fall into the other four fifths for satisfaction of the claims of the holders
of the other $8,oooooo of outstanding bonds.
The practical effect of these well-established common law rules is that under the
law, as it has heretofore stood, a pledgor, whether an individual, a bank, or the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, is not entitled, in a Section 77 reorganization,
either to sell pledged collateral constituting the pledgor's own obligations or, upon
reorganization, unconditionally to take the new securities issuable against the pledged
bonds as owner. The pledgee may take such new securities as owner only if their
value is dearly less than that of the loan. Even then it may be that the pledgee is
fairly entitled, as against other creditors, only to receive such new securities as col-
lateral for some new obligation representing the loan. Particularly may this be true
if the value of the pledged securities approximates, or perhaps exceeds, the amount
of the loan. Just how to treat such collaterally secured obligations has been one of
the most difficult problems with which the Interstate Commerce Commission has
had to deal in reorganizations under Section 77. It has been dear, however, that
under existing law pledgees do not now have rights as "absolute owners" of pledged
collateral.
If, therefore, legislation were designed to enable railroads to reduce their fixed
charges through purchase of their outstanding obligations by collateral loans from
Reconstruction Finance Corporation on the basis of the present established law re-
garding such collateral loans, the borrowing carriers, and investors in their securities,
would get the benefit of a reduction in fixed charges by the difference between the
charges on the purchased securities and the charges on the new loan, provided the
borrower either (a) remained solvent so that the loan could -ultimately be paid off
and the pledged securities retired, or (b), went into receivership or bankruptcy before
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (or any other pledgee--ender or transferee
thereof) sold out the pledge. On the other hand, if the pledgee should sell out the
pledged collateral after a default on the loan and while negotiations were under way
to obviate a reorganization or bankruptcy, other investors in the pledgor-borrower
carrier would be materially injured through the resultant increase in the outstanding-
debt of the borrower.
-It may well be that the potential benefits of such arrangements outweigh the risks
of an adverse result to the borrowing railroad or its investors. However, none of the
bills which have been introduced for the purpose of authorizing loans by Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation for the purpose of effecting reductions of fixed charges
through schemes of the sort hereunder discussion has contemplated that the loans
and pledges should be made upon existing common law terms. All the bills under
discussion in Congress, including S. 2oo9 approved by a Conference Report, have
purported to create in Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and any purchaser of
such a loan obligation from it, rights wholly in conflict with those under existing law
respecting such obligations. For example, S. 20o9, in that portion thereof dealing
with this subject matter, provides that
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... the title of any owner of a collateral note evidencing a loan to a railroad, .. and the
right of any such owner to acquire title to the collateral securing such note, free and clear
of any equity of redemption, . ,* and. thereafter to deal with the same as the absolute
owner thereof, shall not be affected, restricted, or restrained by or pursuant to [the Bank-
ruptcy Act or] by or pursuant to any other provision of law applicable to any proceedings
thereunder.
If (as may be doubtful) such an enactment were effective, this would mean that if
Reconstruction Finance Corporation made a loan of $i,oooooo to enable a railroad
to purchase $2,oooooo of its mortgage bonds, which were in turn pledged to secure
the loan, and the borrower thereafter underwent reorganization, Reconstruction
Finance Corporation or its transferee could sell out the $2,oooooo of pledged bonds,
which would then be selling at discounts much greater even than those prevailing
at the time of their purchase, and would presdmably purchase them itself. If the
$2,ooo,ooo of pledged bonds were selling at io% of their par value (which is typical
of roads now in bankruptcy) this provision would purport to increase the debt of
the borrower, for purposes of determining the rights of the creditors inter se, from
the $Si,ooo,ooo loan to the $2,ooo,ooo of pledged bonds plus the $Soo,ooo deficiency in
the loan. In other words, on th-e illust-rtion given, the borrowing carrier and its
existing investors would, under such legislation, be worse off than they are today by
$8oo,ooo.
Necessarily, most of the loans made under any such legislation would be made
to railroads whose securities are selling at heavy discounts, indicating serious risk of
ultimate bankruptcy. It would therefore seem that even with respect to new loans
hereafter maae under such legislation the probability of injury to investors would so
exceed the probability of benefit as to make it unwise from the standpoint of any
railroad investors that such loans be made.
This provision of S. 2oo9, however, in its present form and as contained in earlier
bills covering the subject matter, goes much further. For example, S. 2956, an earlier
bill containing the language above quoted, contained a provision (which can hardly
be characterized otherwise than as a "joker") designed to give to Reconstruction
Finance Corporation rights which it does not now have, in respect of loans hereto-
fore made by it to railroads which subsequently went into bankruptcy and which
in no probability could obtain any benefits from the proposed legislation. In that bill
the purported enlargement of the existing legal rights with respect to pledges made
to .Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not limited to loans "hereafter made by"
Reconstruction Finance Corporation but was extended to loans "heretofore ... made
by" Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Such loans are now outstanding in almost
.every railroad bankruptcy situation. To grant to Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
or anyone to whom it may sell the notes evidencing loans heretofore made to these
now bankrupt railroads, the right to become the absolute owner of the pledged obli-
gations (and hence of the new securities issuable against them in the reorganization)
irrespective of their value, was obviously a gross discrimination against (i) other
holders of collateral notes of the same bankrupts similarly secured, whether banks or
other institutions, who did not have any such rights as those purported to be given
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to Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and (2) holders of bonds of the issue of
which the pledged bonds were a part, who thus, by ex post facto legislation, would
have their own securities diluted by a flood of collateral at outrageous discounts.
When this discrimination was brought home to the Conference Committee of
Congress considering the proposed legislation, this unfair discrimination was some-
what modified, but not entirely eliminated, in S. 2009. That bill purports to give
the enlarged rights in respect of collateral to any holder of a collateral note evidenc-
ing a loan from Reconstruction Finance Corporation "to a railroad not now in
receivership or involved in proceedings under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act."
In other words, while S. 2009 has eliminated the unfair discrimination contemplated
by S. 2956 in favor of Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans to such roads as
Frisco, New Haven, Milwaukee and Chicago North Western, which are now
actually in bankruptcy, it purports to effect the-same unfair discrimination in favor
of Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans heretofore made to such railroads as
Baltimore & Ohio (which has just undergone a capital readjustment under a section
of the Bankruptcy Act other than Section -), Lehigh Valley (which is in such a
readjustment proceeding and nevertheless now hovering on the verge of Section 77),
and many other railroads whose precarious situation is evidenced by the low prices
at which their securities are now selling.
There seems to be no possible justification for any such attempted enlargement
of the rights of Reconstruction Finance Corporation ex post facto, either in any
benefit which investors might obtain from loans to other railroads by Reconstruction
Finance Corporation under the new legislation or on any broad principle of fairness,
whether or not technically supported by conventional rules of equity. If, as seems
likely, S. 2oo9 is to be returned to Conference on account of other provisions, the
Conference Committee should delete this provision purporting to grant to Recon-
struction Finance Corporation discriminatory rights in connection with loans hereto-
fore made on the basis of the existing law. It may well be doubted that such a
substantial change in the substantive rights of creditors inter se can be accomplished
under our Federal Constitution by such ex post facto legislation. Howevet, pre-
viously accepted principles of constitutional law, at least in so far as they may affect
property rights coming into conflict with some assumed theory of public interest,
have in recent years been thrown into such a state of uncertainty that affected railroad
investors should not remain indifferent to these discriminatory provisions of S. "oo9
merely on the theory that they are unconstitutional by previously accepted standards.
If reduction of fixed charges is to be the real objective of aiy such legislation as
that under consideration, the purported grant of discriminatory rights in favor of
loans by Reconstruction Finance Corporation or any other governmental agency
should, at least, be limited to loans hereafter made under the authorizing legislation.
Indeed any such legislation should expressly contemplate the cancellation of the
purchased bonds except for the sole purpose of evidencing, as security for the con-
templated loans, the proportionate interest of the purchased bonds in the mortgage
under which they are issued.
